Talk:Russell's paradox and Godel's incompleteness theorem prove that the CTMU is invalid./@comment-70.118.254.186-20191029230449

(1) Does G. explicitly incorporate type theory into his 2nd incompleteness theorem? "Where?" If so, would that not itself constitute a statement about classes (or at least those used in formal logic) and thus renew the paradox? If he merely applies (without stating) type theory, he certainly does not do so in the case of his crucial self-referential propositional function. Does arithmetization somehow prevent this? How?

(2)I did not follow the final paragraph, but the idea seems to be to general-ize/extend the problem ontologically to the universe. My sense is that this would merely postpones the problem and, in the process, make the universe a model of the logic that created the problem to start with.

Greg Hodes, Ph.D. ghodes@juno.con